SAPs (Structural Adjustment Policies or Programs) are economic policies which countries must follow in order to qualify for new World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans and help them make debt repayments on the older debts owed to commercial banks, governments and the World Bank. SAPs are designed for individual countries but have common guiding principles and features which include export-led growth; privatisation and liberalisation; and the efficiency of the free market.
SAPs generally require countries to devalue their currencies against the dollar; lift import and export restrictions; balance their budgets and not overspend; and remove price controls and state subsidies.
Devaluation makes their goods cheaper for foreigners to buy and theoretically makes foreign imports more expensive. In principle it should make the country wary of buying expensive foreign equipment. In practice, however, the IMF actually disrupts this by rewarding the country with a large foreign currency loan that encourages it to purchase imports.
Balancing national budgets can be done by raising taxes, which the IMF frowns upon, or by cutting government spending, which it definitely recommends. As a result, SAPs often result in deep cuts in programmes like education, health and social care, and the removal of subsidies designed to control the price of basics such as food and milk. So SAPs hurt the poor most, because they depend heavily on these services and subsidies.
SAPs encourage countries to focus on the production and export of primary commodities such as cocoa and coffee to earn foreign exchange. But these commodities have notoriously erratic prices subject to the whims of global markets which can depress prices just when countries have invested in these so-called 'cash crops'.
By devaluing the currency and simultaneously removing price controls, the immediate effect of a SAP is generally to hike prices up three or four times, increasing poverty to such an extent that riots are a frequent result.
The term "Structural Adjustment Program" has gained such a negative connotation that the World Bank and IMF launched a new initiative, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Initiative, and makes countries develop  Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). While the name has changed, with PRSPs, the World Bank is still forcing countries to adopt the same types of policies as SAPs.
– Structured Adjustment Program – The Whirled Bank Group.
Structural adjustment – the standard IMF/World Bank policy package which calls for slashing government spending, privatization, and opening up countries to exploitative foreign investment, among other measures – has deepened poverty around the world. In the two regions with the most structural adjustment experience, per capita income has stagnated (Latin America) or plummeted (Africa). Structural adjustment has also contributed to the rising inequality of income and wealth in the developing world.
Here's how various structural adjustment policies increase poverty:
Privatization – Structural adjustment policies call for the sell off of government-owned enterprises to private owners, often foreign investors. Privatization is typically associated with layoffs and pay cuts for workers in the privatized enterprises.
Cuts in government spending – Reductions in government spending frequently reduce the services available to the poor, including health and education services (though the IMF and World Bank now say they preserve health and education spending).
Imposition of user fees – Many IMF and World Bank loans call for the imposition of "user fees" – charges for the use of government-provided services like schools, health clinics and clean drinking water. For very poor people, even modest charges may result in the denial of access to services.
Promotion of exports – Under structural adjustment programs, countries undertake a variety of measures to promote exports, at the expense of production for domestic needs. In the rural sector, the export orientation is often associated with the displacement of poor people who grow food for their own consumption, as their land is taken over by large plantations growing crops for foreign markets.
Higher interest rates – Higher interest rates exert a recessionary effect on national economies, leading to higher rates of joblessness. Small businesses, often operated by women, find it more difficult to gain access to affordable credit, and often are unable to survive.
Trade Liberalization – The elimination of tariff protections for industries in developing countries often leads to mass layoffs. In Mozambique, for example, the IMF and World Bank ordered the removal of an export tax on cashew nuts. The result: 10,000 adults, mostly women, lost their jobs in cashew nut-processing factories. Most of the processing work shifted to India, where child laborers shell the nuts at home.
– How International Monetary Fund (IMF)/ World Bank structural adjustment programs have increased poverty around the world from Essential Action.
The current crisis in Bolivia is social, economic and political, and bears the clear imprint of IMF policies. Despite improvement in social service coverage, poverty and vulnerability have been increasing. The vulnerability of families to shocks and displacement, especially among the rural poor, has worsened dramatically. Economically, growth has been poor, and accompanied by growing structural unemployment and underemployment. Over 7 of 10 new jobs created in the past 15 years have been in the "informal" sector.
Bolivia has been a model student of IMF "reforms", and is now also a showcase for the contradictions and crisis these policies engender. After almost two decades of "reform" and structural adjustment, Bolivia is growing slowly, if at all. Bolivians are increasingly vulnerable and poor, while society in general is increasingly inequitable and unjust. IMF policy prescriptions have systematically removed essential economic policy decisions from the popular political process, and successive governments have been limited to administering IMF policy prescriptions. The IMF claims to recognize the call by civil society organizations to include "macroeconomic issues" in Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) dialogs, but disingenuously suggests that such issues must be taken up by national governments - the same governments whose hands are tied by IMF conditionalities.
– The IMF and the Bolivian Crisis by Tom Kruse, CEDLA (Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario) - La Paz/ Cochabamba, Bolivia.
The World Bank and IMF imposed prescriptions on indebted nations under the façade of structural adjustment. One such structural adjustment program took place in Costa Rica. Before the IMF and World Bank restructured Costa Rica’s economy, it was well known for its stable and thriving local markets. It had a strong base of small farmers and few large land holdings. The policies set by the IMF and World Bank shifted economic incentives away from small farmers producing foods that Costa Ricans eat toward large estates producing for export.
As a result, thousands of small farmers have lost their lands, which have since been consolidated into large ranches and agricultural estates producing for export. This created a massive growth in Costa Rica’s income gap – leading to an outbreak of crime and violence in a once famously peaceful nation. The country now depends on imports to meet its basic food requirements, and the foreign debt that was supposed to be relieved through structural adjustment has now doubled. This is how the IMF and World Bank create a constant need for their "services", thus pushing indebted nations further into debt.
As outrageous as the outcomes of their policies have been, the IMF and World Bank point to Costa Rica as a structural adjustment success story because economic growth has increased and the country is now able to meet its growing debt service payments.
– Corporate Globalization and the Death of Self-Determination from FTAA Resistance.
Over the first period of adjustment, from 1989-1993, IMF fiscal adjustment requirements were introduced in an effort to reduce the government budget deficit. These included substantial reductions in current government expenditures (-30%) and capital expenditures (-15%), in addition to tax increases. Structural reforms also began during this period, including privatizations and some financial reforms.
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In order to reach the budget surplus target, the IMF required labor market deregulation, price decontrol, trade reform, reductions in civil service employment, and faster privatization (External Review, p. 97). The IMF also advocated devaluation of Cote d'Ivoire's currency, the Franc CFA, which occurred in January 1994.
Impact on the Economy
From 1989-1993, per capita GDP fell by 15%, pushed along by the overvaluation of the exchange rate and deterioration in the terms of trade (External Review, p. 95-96). The social impact of IMF structural adjustment on Cote d'Ivoire was severe. Between 1988-1995, the incidence and intensity of poverty doubled, with the number of people earning less than $1/day increasing from 17.8% of the population to 36.8%. In Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire's largest city, the rate of urban poverty rose from 5% to 20% between 1993 and 1995 (External Review, p. 101).
Impact on Health Care and Education Spending
Between 1990 and 1995, real per capita spending on health care fell slightly and education spending fell dramatically (External Review, p. 101, 105). During the period of IMF structural adjustment (1990-1995), real per capita public spending on education declined by more than 35%. Moreover, reductions in the wages of civil servants required by the IMF also led to a reduction in teacher salaries (External Review, p. 103). The Review points out that lower wages probably lowered teachers' motivation, and educational quality may have suffered as a result. Despite an improvement in gross enrollment in primary schools over the period 1986-1995, educational indicators overall showed poor results. By 1995, only 45% of girls from the poorest quintile of households were receiving primary education. At the secondary level, the gross enrollment rate declined from 34% to 31% between 1986 and 1995 (External Review, p. 104).
– A Survey of the Impacts of IMF Structural Adjustment in Africa by Robert Naiman and Neil Watkins, April 1999.
Ghana launched its Structural Adjustment program in 1983 in the form of an Economic Recovery Program (ERP). In the late 1980s, Ghana's program was perceived as "the model" by the IMF and the World Bank. Today, the IMF and the World Bank are very reluctant to refer to Ghana as their model.
Too often, restrictions on domestic spending tend to reduce output and employment. This is what happened in Ghana. Under the ERP in Ghana, measures were taken to re-deploy the civil service personnel by 5 percent. This resulted in about 150,000 civil servants being laid off each year from 1986 to 1989. This happened because a standard set of reforms was prescribed, this being one, irrespective of Ghana's particular situation.
Subsidy removals, another common prescription, increase prices and devaluation tends to increase the domestic price of imports, which is eventually passed on to the consumer, causing high inflation rates. In Ghana, Inflation averaged about 30 percent in the 1990s, but wage adjustments always lagged behind the rate of inflation, thus reducing the purchasing power of wage earners.
Market liberalization, which SAPs often demand, results in very high interest rates. Lending rates in Ghana averaged about 36 percent between 1998 and 2000, making the cost of borrowed capital extremely expensive. This stifled investment and growth.
SAPs have also left a huge debt over-hang in many developing countries. Ghana's foreign debt rose from about US$1 billion in 1983 to about US$6 billion in 2000.
– The IMF and the World Bank by Dr. John Kofi Baffoe.
Hungary became a member of the IMF in 1982 and has since implemented a series of structural adjustment agreements. Over time, neoliberal economists came to occupy key positions in the National Planning Ministry, the Finance Ministry, and the National Bank, establishing the so-called "financial government". The goals of the IMF and the government during the 1980s were to establish a controlled market economy and to open the country to foreign investors. In the 1990s, price controls have been lifted, trade has been liberalized and the National Bank has gained broad autonomy in implementing monetary policy. In this decade, wages, employment and services have declined for the population generally and have fallen markedly for a number of major sectors, while the economy has contracted and stagnated.
– The case of Hungary by Károly Lóránt.
In India, more than 70 percent of rural households are small marginal farmers or landless farm workers representing a population of over 400 million people. In irrigated areas, agricultural workers are employed for 200 days a year, and in rain-fed farming for approximately 100 days. The phasing out of fertiliser subsidies (an explicit condition of the IMF agreement) and the increase in the prices of farm inputs and fuel is pushing a large number of small and medium sized farmers into bankruptcy.
A micro-level study conducted in 1991 on starvation deaths among handloom weavers in a relatively prosperous rural community in Andhra Pradesh sheds light on how local communities have been impoverished as a result of macro-economic reform. The starvation deaths occurred in the months following the implementation of the 1991 New Economic Policy: with the devaluation and the lifting of controls on cotton yarn exports, the jump in the domestic price of cotton yarn led to a collapse in the pacham (24meters) rate paid to the weaver by the middle-man (through the putting-out system). "Radhakrishnamurthy and his wife were able to weave between three and four pachams a month bringing home the meagre income of 300-400 rupees for a family of six ($12-16), then came the Union Budget of July 24, 1991,the price of cotton yarn jumped and the burden was passed on to the weaver, Radhakrishnamurthy's family income declined to Rs. 240-320 a month ($9.60-13.00)". Radhakrishnamurthy of Gollapalli village in Guntur district died of starvation on September 4, 1991. Between August 30 and November 10,1991 at least 73 starvation deaths were reported in only two districts of Andhra Pradesh. There are 3.5 million handlooms throughout India supporting a population of some 17 million people.
– Global Poverty in the Late 20th Century by Michel Chossudovsky.
Since Indonesia signed a structural adjustment program with the IMF in 1997, following the East Asian financial crisis, the situation for the country's masses has worsened, said Pribadi, a representative of the militant and independent FNPBI union federation.
The biggest impact has come from the removal of subsidies on basic goods, he said, which has forced prices up at the same time that jobs are being lost and wages are going down.
A medical worker, Pribadi told of the effects of IMF-enforced structural adjustment on the country's health system: the removal of subsidies on medicines has made it difficult for poor families to afford drugs, he said. Indonesia's pharmaceutical industry is dominated by foreign giants, like Bayer and Pfizer.
The only major beneficiaries of structural adjustment, he argued, were Western creditors, whose billion-dollar loans have been guaranteed by the IMF package.
– Indonesian unionist condemns IMF by Tony Iltis .
Former Prime Minister Michael Manley was elected on a non-IMF platform in 1976. He was forced to sign Jamaica's first loan agreement with the IMF in 1977 due to lack of viable alternatives – a global pattern common throughout the Third World. At present Jamaica owes over $4.5 billion to the IMF, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) among other international lending agencies yet the meaningful development that these loans have "promised" has yet to manifest.
In actuality the amount of foreign exchange that must be generated to meet interest payments and the structural adjustment policies which have been imposed with the loans have had a negative impact on the lives of the vast majority. The country is paying out increasingly more than it receives in total financial resources, and if benchmark conditionalities are not met, the structural adjustment program is made more stringent with each re-negotiation. To improve balance of payments, devaluation (which raises the cost of foreign exchange), high interest rates (which raise the cost of credit), and wage guidelines (which effectively reduce the price of local labor) are prescribed.
The IMF assumes that the combination of increased interest rates and cutbacks in government spending will shift resources from domestic consumption to private investment. It is further assumed that keeping the price of labor down will be an incentive for increasing employment and production. Increased unemployment, sweeping corruption, higher illiteracy, increased violence, prohibitive food costs, dilapidated hospitals, increased disparity between rich and poor characterize only part of the present day economic crisis.
– Life and Debt, a film by Stephanie Black.
Through the 1980s and 1990s, most developing countries steadily took out loans from both institutions which committed them to measures that often amounted to turning over economic policymaking to Washington-based bureaucrats. Those measures – the standard components of virtually all Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) – included deregulation of trade and investment, deep cuts in domestic budgets, including in health and education, massive layoffs of public sector employees, privatization of government-owned enterprises, curtailment of subsidies, hikes in interest rates and other measures to restrict credit, and a general re-orientation to exports as opposed to support for domestic industry and self-sufficiency.
One straightforward example of this re-orientation was the shift in Kenyan food policy. From the time of independence until the interventions of the IMF and World Bank (also known as the international financial institutions, or IFIs), the Kenyan government had an official policy of achieving food self-sufficiency.
That changed to “food security” in the mid-1980s – in other words, not necessarily producing all the food needed within the country, but ensuring an adequate supply from whatever source. And indeed, an analysis by KIPPRA, Kenya’s top economic think-tank, which often collaborates with the government and the World Bank, finds that “After the [IMF/World Bankdesigned] reforms, the country moved from broad self-sufficiency in production of most food staples to a net importer.” – Kenya's Chronic Food Crisis: Natural Disasters or Logical Consequences? by Soren Ambrose, August 2006.
Reports of a devastating famine in Malawi first surfaced as rumors coming from rural areas of the country around October 2001. Malawians in the cities, including government officials in Lilongwe, the capital, were slow to believe, or act on, the persistent accounts. Even when well-known advocacy groups like the Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN) and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace presented data to back up the reports, they were dismissed as lacking credibility. But incredible as it may have seemed, Malawi – hardly a desert state, but a densely-populated country in a lush region – really was facing catastrophic food shortages in the wake of a combination of flooding and a regional drought, and after over a decade of "structural adjustment" policies designed by the IMF.
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The context for the crisis in Malawi is the IMF's (and the World Bank's) continuing quest to privatize every portion of the economy that can conceivably be wrested from the government. This mission is by no means limited to Malawi; it is fast becoming the new modus operandi for the institutions everywhere they operate. More and more, observers are coming to fear that near-wholesale privatization of developing country governments is the agenda for the IMF and World Bank after 20 years of devastating their capacity through structural adjustment programs.
At the heart of the privatization agenda in Malawi is the agricultural liberalization program. Among its features are the reduction or elimination of programs supplying small farmers with fertilizer, seeds, and credit, often subsidized, and providing consumers with subsidies for basic food and other "price stabilization interventions." The IMF has prioritized the privatization of the agencies that have provided support for farmers and food security, the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) and the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA).
– Famine in Malawi Exposes IMF Negligence by Arnaud Zacharie.
As a result of a series of agreements reached between the Mexican government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since the mid-1980s, a set of policies aimed at trade liberalization, large-scale privatization and general economic deregulation was implemented. As a result, the Mexican economy became increasingly dependent on capital inflows (particularly short-term portfolio investments) to finance its growing current-account deficit. These inflows contributed to the overvaluation of the peso in the early 1990s, and, when the international community judged the current-account deficit to be unsustainable, $5 billion in capital fled the country. The value of the peso plummeted, interest rates soared, and by early 1995 the Mexican economy was plunged into its worst economic depression in 60 years, the effects of which are still being felt by the large majority of Mexicans – despite claims of recovery by the IMF and U.S. and Mexican policymakers. Furthermore, Mexico's financial infrastructure remains precariously unstable.
– The Micro-Economic Impact of IMF Structural Adjustment Policies in Mexico by Alejandro Nadal, El Colegio de México/Equipo PUEBLO.
The IMF has helped foster a severe depression in Russia
Russia in the 1990s has witnessed a peacetime economic contraction of unprecedented scale. Many believe much of the blame for the social and economic catastrophe rests with the IMF, which has had a central role in designing and supervising Russia's economic policy since 1992.
The number of Russians in poverty has risen from 2 million to 60 million since the IMF came to post-Communist Russia. Male life expectancy has dropped sharply from 65 years to 57. Economic output is down by at least 40 percent.
The IMF's shock therapy – sudden and intense structural adjustment – helped bring about this disaster
"In retrospect, its hard to see what could have been done wrong that wasn't," Mark Weisbrot of the Center for Economic and Policy Research told a Congressional committee in late 1998. "First there was an immediate de-control of prices. Given the monopoly structure of the economy, as well as the large amount of cash savings accumulated by Russian households, inflation soared 520 percent in the first three months. Millions of people saw their savings and pensions reduced to crumbs."
"Then the IMF and Russian policymakers compounded their mistakes," Weisbrot explained. "In order to push inflation down, the authorities slammed on the monetary and fiscal brakes, bringing about a depression. Privatization was carried out in a way that enriched a small class of people, while the average persons income fell by about half within four years."
Meanwhile, Russia kept its economy functioning with an influx of foreign funds, lent at astronomically high interest rates because of the strong possibility of default. In 1998, with the Asian crisis still unfolding and with Russian default seemingly near, the IMF agreed to a $23 billion loan package to Russia, seeking to maintain the rubles overvalued exchange rate. An initial $4.8 billion portion of the loan left the country immediately [...] some used to pay off foreign lenders, much of it stolen by Russian politicians.
– IMF versus Russia by Vladimir Shestakov.
An IMF stabilization program began in Senegal in 1980 and a longer-term structural adjustment program in 1986. While the IMF has touted Senegal as a success story because of its increased growth rate, lower inflation and smaller budget deficit, in fact the country has failed to achieve a stable, sustainable growth that effectively reaches the poor. Unemployment and hunger have increased and are widespread. The quality of social services, such as education and health, including infant and maternity care, has declined, hitting women, who make up the vast majority of the poor, particularly hard.
– Gender and Social Dimensions of IMF Policies in Senegal by Yassine Fall, Partners for African Development and Economic Justice.
The structural adjustment program reinforced Somalia's dependence on imported grain. From the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, food aid increased 15-
fold, at the rate of 31 per cent per annum. Combined with increased commercial imports, this influx of cheap surplus wheat and rice sold in the
domestic market led to the displacement of domestic producers, as well as a major shift in food consumption patterns to the detriment of traditional
crops (maize and sorghum).
The devaluation of the Somali Shilling imposed by the IMF in June 1981 was followed by periodic devaluations, leading to hikes in the prices of fuel,
fertiliser and farm inputs.
The impact on agriculturalists was immediate, particularly in rain-fed agriculture but also in the area of irrigated farming.
Urban purchasing power declined dramatically, government extension programs were curtailed, infrastructure collapsed, the deregulation of the grain
market and the influx of "food aid" led to the impoverishment of farming communities.
Also, during this period, much of the best agricultural land was appropriated by bureaucrats, army officers and merchants with connections to the government.
Rather than promoting food production for the domestic market, the donors were encouraging the development of so-called "high value added" fruits, vegetables, oilseeds and cotton for export on the best irrigated farmland.
– The real causes of Somalia's famine by Michel Chossudovsky.
On 23 August 2001, Korea repaid its final installment to the IMF, much earlier than originally planned. President Kim joyfully announced that the Korean economy had finally awakened from the crisis and the IMF congratulated Korea for recording "a major milestone" and for "the close cooperation between Korea and the IMF that has been exemplary… and serves as model for other countries." Perhaps these reactions are not completely false, since the economic crisis and restructuring that followed did benefit some. However, for the vast majority of ordinary peoples and workers, it has only been a continuation of a nightmare that sees no end. Almost four years have passed since Korea started its restructuring process, and now Korea stands as the world's highest-indebted country in short-term (maturity of less than one year) debt, ranks seventh in total debt, and State debt has reached dangerous levels due to the astronomical amount of public funds poured into the restructuring process. Millions of workers have been thrown onto the streets and wages have plummeted – resulting in unprecedented level of poverty and inequality. This seems rather grim for a country praised as being a model of "IMF success".
– The SAP and its Effects on the Korean People from Kim Hee Joon, a member of the Korean People's Action Against BITs & WTO (KoPA).
Sri Lanka has now endured the World Bank’s stabilization and structural adjustment programs for 15 years. …
The removal of subsidies for fertilizers and competition from imported grain have caused many independent small-scale farmers to abandon farming. There has been an increase in the number of agricultural laborers.
The gap between the rich and the poor has also increased. Between 1953 and 1973, the share of income enjoyed by the top 10% of the households decreased from 40% to 28% while the share of the bottom 40% increased from 14% to 19%. Since then, the share of the top 10% has increased to more than 40% while that of the bottom 40% has declined to 11%. The difference between the income of the top 20% and the bottom 20% in the whole of Asia today is the highest in Sri Lanka.
An important consequence of the fall in incomes of the lowest strata is the emergence of malnutrition among children. The percentage of children suffering from chronic malnutrition has increased sharply since 1972. School dropouts have also increased with 35% of students leaving school before the fifth grade.
– Debt and Structural Adjustment in Sri Lanka by Vijaya Kumar.
The conditionalities that were imposed on African countries represented a takedown of the government. These conditionalities were: no foreign exchange controls; no development, because, "You clearly don't have money for that, do you?''; no subsidies to people for food or anything else. For instance, in 1985, when the country of Sudan was in the midst of a terrible famine, the IMF refused any credit to Sudan and the country was put under a donors' embargo, because it had refused to end food subsidies. When I asked an IMF desk officer why this was happening, and said that an end to subsidies would mean that more people would starve, he answered, "Yes, but it is good for the economy''; a cutback of services to the point of nonexistence.
–  Africa gives a glimpse at your own future by Linda de Hoyos.
The IMF structural adjustment program in Tanzania began in 1986, with additional agreements signed in 1987, 1991 and 1996. As agriculture is by far the most important sector in terms of employment (over 80 percent), contribution to GDP (over 60 percent) and foreign-exchange earnings (75 percent), much of the Fund's policy interventions have focused on that sector. While agricultural production and exports have increased since the adjustment program began, so have rural poverty, income inequality, food insecurity, malnutrition and environmental degradation. As a result, Tanzania has become ever more dependent on foreign aid.
– The impact of IMF structural adjustment policies on Tanzanian agriculture by Ross Hammond.
Chitalu Mwape leaves her two-roomed house in one of Lusaka's shanty townships every morning around 4 am with her nine-months old baby Chaba on her back. She walks about five kilometres to sit by a busy highway crushing stones with nothing but an iron bar in her hand. She sells the stones to rich people who are building houses or who simply want to decorate their driveways.
Chitalu does this until well after 5 pm when she starts the long trek back home, exhausted and sometimes dejected because she has not sold anything. She will be back tomorrow though, doing the same job. The dust from the crushed stones has given little Chaba a bad cough but Chitalu cannot worry about that right now, she has to help feed her other five children plus the four orphans from her husband's family. Besides there is no point sacrificing for Chaba who looks like she will die anyway, because although Chitalu feeds her the same food the family eats, the child does not grow or put on any weight and she continues to look sickly. If she had some money to spare she would take her to the hospital, but for now she just has to pray and hope for the best.
In Zambia, the story of Chitalu is not unique. There are many more like her, what with the government's strict adherence to the structural adjustment programme that the country is on. The last few months have produced many cases like Chitalu's, and many a lot worse.
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In Zambia, where most of the poor of the poorest of the poor are women, both in the rural and urban areas, SAP has proved to be a bitter pill to swallow. It has meant death from malnutrition in both mothers and their children. It has meant disruption of the family life for women like Chitalu who have to be up before the crack of dawn to go and do tasks which may be detrimental to their health and that of their children only to come back home late at night too exhausted to spend any time with their children.
– The effects of structural adjustment on women in Zambia by Priscilla Jere-Mwiindilila.
The biggest disaster to have hit Zimbabwe is the IMF/WORLD BANK sponsored structural adjustment program critically implemented at the beginning of 1990. This was at a time when the country was suffocating from the debts partly accrued by the Smith regime [the last white government] to repress the liberation struggle and some accrued after independence. The above mentioned financial institutions had leverage as is the situation with most developing countries to compel countries to implement structural adjustment on the discredited pretext that it's the way to develop economically .
With the SAPs public services were hit hard. Expenditure on medical staff and drugs was cut significantly. Education budgets were slashed. Exorbitant fees were introduced for all secondary schools and colleges which were previously free. This whole new dispensation brought the greatest disadvantage to the most vulnerable.
State subsidies on food and price controls were removed and people started starving. The country sank deeper and deeper into debt as the structural adjustment program depended on huge borrowings. By 1997 the country was now spending seven times more on debt-servicing than on education and health.
– Interview with John Bomba, a leading democracy activist in Zimbabwe.
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Chronological list of states subjected to SAPs by Cecil.
Text version for printing